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by the task they set themselves,—the task of copying, under the conditions of space and time, to some slight degree, the glory of that divine original.

I have reached the limits of this address. And yet, the thought is capable of being extended and enlarged upon in many ways. Out of the silence have we come, and into the silence shall we pass. A silence not empty, but, like the star-sown canopy of night, replete with light, and power, and law. Vainly, as I think, do men seek to frame the meaning of the Universe into a word. Let us desist from such useless efforts. Let us deepen in ourselves the sense of the infinitude and the majesty of it all, and revere the radiant mystery in a silence like its own!

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

DISCUSSION.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF PHILOSOPHY.*

“THE battle for a new meaning of life has broken out, the point in question is the striving for a new social philosophy.” These words of the preface best characterize the purport and contents of this thorough, comprehensive work. Ludwig Stein finished it last year, after having already dwelt upon its subject-matter in lectures given since 1890, whilst he was instructor at Zurich, and again as Professor at Berne.

The tone of the lecturer has been preserved throughout the book. Its freshness and vivacity have thereby been enhanced to such an extent that one readily overlooks the drawback of repetitions which are often needless.

This origin will explain why Stein allots relatively so much space (pp. 175–510) to his “*Outlines of a History of Social Philosophy*,” in spite of the fact that he can naturally offer us little that is new on the subject. The chapter on “*Original Forms of Communal and Social Life*” (56–174) is also historical to a great extent,

* “*Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie.*” *Vorlesungen über Socialphilosophie und ihre Geschichte*, von Dr. Ludwig Stein, ord. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Bern. (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1897. Pp. 792.)

although he here presents us with some original theories. The scholar who is already acquainted with the social problem will find the chief value of this voluminous work in the introductory lectures (1-55), which prove the right of philosophy to consider the social question, and in the third part, "Principles of a System of Social Philosophy" (511-777). In the other parts, students will find a wealth of information and numerous references to original authors. This is in accord with the intention of the author to address a wide public.

He at the same time very earnestly warns us against a popularization of results, before science has definitely pronounced itself in favor of them (27).

Stein starts from the point of view of the aristocracy of intellect: "The crass, witless crowd" can, perhaps, be temporarily satisfied with a Socialism which merely considers material questions. But not so "the intellectual upper ten thousand" (12). In order that the social question may not be considered a mere "beef and pudding" question, it is not merely the right, but the duty of philosophy to speak upon the matter. If Socialism is to mean progress, it must be "permeated with pure religious (not ecclesiastical-dogmatic) elements and be nourished on moral ideas." The chief social problem is this: "Under what conditions must individual and social groups, economical and socially advanced, work and live together, so that the social organization to be formed shall be adjusted to the greatest satisfaction of all the members?" (14.)

The author's answer to this question is that "in the first place there must be a biological advance,—*i.e.*, an elevation of the physical man through social selection, then an ethico-social perfection to be realized through the socialization of church and state, of art, and science, and education, the improvement of the type of man and development of future generations through education into social beings" (766, 767).

To rightly grasp this solution, one must closely observe that by "Socialism" Stein does not mean the same thing that most people do. For he says (331, 332), "In order to bridge the seemingly bottomless abyss which separates individualism from collectivism, and to abolish the inner antagonism existing between freedom and equality, one must seek a compromise between the two. This compromise is Socialism, which opposes both the abolition of private property and the continued usury of capitalistic individualism while making concessions to each of these apparently irreconcilable attitudes."

The elementary principle of religious and ethical imperatives, which Stein, purposely leaning on Kant, enunciates, must hold this goal in view (690, 697, 705). "So act that all your doings may be not merely an expression of your own life, but also of that of your fellow-men, and thus insure and elevate the life of generations to come."

The evolutionary and socialistic character of the work before us has thus been shown, provided, of course, that one may term opinions "socialistic" which always emphasize the importance and meaning of private property, and assume, as an established fact, "that private property, presupposing a *do ut des*, is a far better school for the awakening of altruistic sentiments than is common property" (104).

Stein knows that specialists are unanimous in saying that property was originally communistic (92), and that private property subsequently developed therefrom. Basing himself upon A. H. Post, he opines (94) that the varying height and strength of the tribesmen first produced the individualization of property in implements (nets, bows, arrows). But I consider these physiological causes of the origin of private property improbable. In all armies, wherever marked physical differences were taken into account in the distribution of arms and other equipments, a man did not obtain a lasting proprietary right to his weapon, sword, or horse, even in the states where military service lasted half a man's life. The distribution of implements must have been similarly conducted among the primitive communistic hordes. The mere fact that a man is not of the same strength throughout his life, but gradually weakens without becoming immediately unfit for work, would tend to necessitate a change of weapons, and would thus greatly impede the growth of the idea of the right of individual property.

As a rule, the same implements would be suitable for nearly all the members of such a tribe, as yet but little differentiated. Even if in single cases private property had arisen in the way mentioned by Stein, these would always be of less importance as compared with the radical changes in the forms of ownership, caused by the taming of animals, and tillage,—*i.e.*, by changes in the form of production. On this matter, Stein relevantly remarks that, "the rise of slavery is an event running parallel with the taming of animals; the slave is nothing more than a tamed man" (95). The progress is due to the fact that from selfish, rational motives the foe is no longer treated as a predatory animal, but as a domestic

one. At first, cattle and slaves are the common property of the tribe, but the election of the first chief is the social fall (99). Private property first arose with the chief (100), to whose descendants it was transmitted. Differences of rank arise, social differentiation begins. After the transition to husbandry, the *ager privatus* crumbles away from the *ager publicus*. Whereas in prehistoric times communal property prevails, private property is more and more noticeable in historic times. This happens because "the idea of property always takes the shape which is most adapted to the social requirements of the time" (102). To-day, "the desire for a modification of the idea of property is appearing, strong and inevitable, like a law of nature" (103). Stein, too, admits that property is merely an historical category, and in the course of time may disappear, just as it arose. But he considers that the time has not yet arrived for such a sweeping revolution. In fact, one must assume that he believes the time will never arrive, for, in the chapter entitled, "Logical Inconsistencies in Our Present Conceptions of Property," while placing "expediency in the foreground," he admits the necessity of retaining private property (565). Nevertheless, Stein agrees that in the course of centuries, and in case all palliative measures have failed to bear fruit, a future generation should, as an *ultima ratio*, be permitted to abolish that right of inheritance, which he now warmly defends (573).

This is a concession which, even academically considered, is of small worth. For, presumably, this distant future will not allow itself to be in any way restricted in the execution of that which it may think expedient.

As special evidence in favor of Stein's statement that "private property exerts a highly altruistic and therefore moral influence" (105), he alleges that "adherents of Socialism are often found even among the most wealthy, who, impelled by pity for the widespread misery of the proletariat, or by a feeling of justice, seek a new order of society, the costs of which would in the first instance have to be borne by themselves. This is an evident victory of altruism, born naturally of private property, over a narrow egoism." In this matter the present writer may be said to speak with some special knowledge, for he is one of those well-to-do adherents of Socialism whose convictions are due to scientific study and not to a desire for the improvement of their own personal condition. In the first place, it must with regret be said that the number of those whose attitude towards Socialism means disadvantages to themselves

is very small. But the more Socialists one finds among those favored by the present order of society, the more sharply will this order be condemned. What can a society be worth whose condition causes those who suffer by it to hate and curse it, and in which, even among its beneficiaries, more and more voices are heard proclaiming it to be a horrible evil and a disgrace to mankind? Can private property be justified when not only the poor believe that therein lies the source of all their woe, but also the rich may be found (according to Stein, even "often") seeking its abolition because they think it economically and morally bad? Can an institution which, on account of its fruits, is increasingly condemned even by its beneficiaries, be such "an excellent school for the elevation of morality" that a conscious reorganization of society could not dispense with "this happy factor in the evolution of moral ideas" (105)? I must confess that only the converse of this would have appeared to me conclusive,—namely, if Stein had shown that private property had proved such a blessing that not only the smallest property owners, but the most miserable paupers, being convinced of its equity in spite of the injury to themselves, favored the ideals of capitalistic individualism, and therefore objected to the new order of society. Then, indeed, the altruistic influences of those conceptions of property, which in their main outlines have been the same for thousands of years, would have been proved. Stein's method of demonstration seems to me, however, to prove the greatness of the misery which has been produced by the school he considers indispensable to the future. With the same logic, one could declare that slavery, or, at any rate, serfdom, was a prominent and indispensable factor in furthering morality, for even in this case some of the lords desired the abolition of an institution by which they benefited: as witness the celebrated evening of August, 1789.

Still more surprising is Stein's conception of the manner in which private property "naturally" awakens altruism. Apart from a reference to Spencer's "Data of Ethics," Stein adduces only one argument in support of his opinion. He maintains that under primitive conditions one could produce what he needed, and be "thus independent of his fellow-men, and consequently inaccessible to altruistic motives" (104). But with civilization "the mutual interdependence of man increases. . . . This everlasting transformation of the *do ut des* must finally increase the consciousness of human solidarity (Zusammengehörigkeit), and thus naturally

produce the moral sense of altruism in the highest degree" (104). If the premises were not so radically wrong, the conclusion would be right. Primeval man (with the exception of a few who led solitary lives) is an undifferentiated member of his horde, his tribe, his clan, upon which he and all his economic religious and other interests are dependent. Far from being "independent of his fellow-men," he is closely bound to them, and goes through an altruistic schooling which expresses itself quite differently (and in the self-sacrifice for the tribe often of much higher moral value) from the cunning, selfish calculation of the *do ut des* policy which Stein so much approves. This is a policy which in actual life and among highly civilized men has led as often to the most wicked attempts to exploit and overreach, as to a rational, voluntary consideration for others. True, this altruism is only exercised in favor of the members of his own tribe, and becomes egoism in his relations with other tribes. International morality is the product of a later epoch. According to Stein's argument, mutual consideration and a higher morality ought to develop more quickly in a state without hereditary property in which individuals are far more dependent upon each other than is the case to-day.

If one holds up the catch-phrase "decentralization of labor, but centralization of interests" as the true formula for modern society, he will find that both conditions would best be realized under a collective ownership,—*i.e.*, a state ownership of the means of production. Separate economic interests hinder the collective intellectual interests. Even to-day the independent manufacturer cannot decentralize labor to anything like the same extent that the State does in its undertakings.

Even if Stein were right in saying that private property is an excellent school in which to elevate moral ideas, which the present writer emphatically denies, he is wrong in saying that this school will always exist. If private property is an eminent pedagogic medium, it must be remembered that the final aim of all education is to make itself superfluous. As the child outgrows the school, so should humanity finally outgrow that stage in which, according to Stein, private property is serviceable, and according to Marx simply necessary. Whether this moment has already come is, of course, another question. One can believe with Stein that the time has not yet come, and even that it will not come in the twentieth century, without advocating the retention of private property for all time under certain restrictions. His formula for the future

amounts to this: the social ideal, philosophically expressed, is individualism mollified by the communistic character of national institutions (106). He calls this the "*aurea mediocritas* of compromise." Fully as I agree with him that "the salvation of mankind does not lie in extreme measures," I can discover in his attempt at compromise only the *mediocritas* without the golden glitter of the ideal. This is at once evident when he asserts that "science, art, and technical industries have developed historically on the basis of private property," whence it may rightly be deduced that so far it "has been continually associated with the civilization of Western Europe and America" (why not include the Japanese? the limitation is not quite explicable). For Stein hesitatingly declares that private property has accompanied, "even if it has not been an unconditional presupposition" of this type of civilization. Communistic experiments would endanger the results and the very existence of our present civilization, "the extermination or mere endangering of which nothing but sheer madness will bring about." The opponents of innovations have at all times fought with such high sounding phrases. As we know, no Roman or Greek could picture a civilization that was not based on the slavery of the majority, and yet our civilization, without this basis, is in all respects much higher and richer than Rome's, and superior in most respects to that of Athens. In an age which brings forth surprising discoveries every year (X-rays) and inventions (telegraphy without wires), the fact that a thing has not been is no "sure proof" that it will never be.

It would be rash to leap straightway into communism when the preliminary steps in favor of it in all branches are unknown, and cannot be known in the present state of development of even the most advanced nations. Thus, the opinion that danger to civilization arises from communism, has yet to be proved. Such an argument is of the timorous, shallow, but "effective" sort, which finds so much favor in the low regions of politics, but which in the higher walks of science ought to be avoided as much as possible, or used, if at all, with great caution. During a certain period of human development, private property was indispensable; that it does today, however, and that in all the future it will "doubtless exercise a civilizing and moralizing influence" (106), is a private opinion of Stein's as bold as it is incapable of proof.

The present writer must confess that he receives just the reverse impression: with the continuance of private property he thinks that egoism will flourish, and the treating of others as a means and

never as an end in themselves, giving them as little as possible while taking the utmost for one's self. The *do ut des* principle appears to me strongly egoistic. It is difficult to realize how Stein can call this maxim a motto of altruism, for it is not a utopian, but a realistic egoism reckoning with the attainable. Altruism consists in giving without expecting to receive a reward in return. A universal application of the formula *do ut des* would simply be an unthinkable retrogression in morality. An institution basing itself upon this principle is thereby already stigmatized as a stage of development which the progress of civilization must surpass, and is ethically condemned.

Stein's fundamental principle of morality, already quoted, may be more readily applied to a member of a socialized community than to the owner of private property. The latter, while maintaining his own life and that of his descendants, naturally diminishes the possibilities of life of his competitors in the economic struggle for existence, and often to such an extent as to make their life and that of their descendants impossible.

"The strength of Socialism lies in the weakness of its opponents" (290). This opinion of Stein's is confirmed by his own example. Like so many others, his dislike for a complete abolition of hereditary property is engendered by the conviction that "despotism is the bosom friend of communism" (300). "Without a severe despotism communism is unthinkable" (327). He says, "Communism doling out its provisions in equal shares is unacceptable; firstly, because equality is incompatible with the human inequality established by nature, and, secondly, because the inevitable despotic suppression of individual freedom, which is a feature of all communism, is not desirable. For this purpose, too, the modern individual is far too greatly differentiated" (331). In terms not less severe, Stein, however, rejects "capitalistic individualism," which, in a one-sided way, favors income without work, that is, capitalists living at the expense of those who do the intellectual and physical work.

Profit, Stein considers entirely justified as a reward for the management of production. He, however, forgets that this function, like everything else, is only worth its just reward; this reward, however, as compared with the pay of public and private officials and of workingmen, is much too high. If one rejects income without work as unjustifiable, it is necessary to find for all sorts of work useful to society, incomes more correctly graduated than is

the case to-day. He who seeks this solution will be able and willing to seek to preserve the necessary (but by no means extensive) freedom of the individual under collectivism. The opposite of Stein's opinion might be expressed thus: the social ideal is that form of collectivism in state organizations which is modified by individualism, which always sets the interests of the community in the foreground, and which on this account carefully takes into consideration the differences of individuality, to the advantage of the living and coming generations. On the basis of common property, unequal reward for unequal tasks can be executed with as much equity and justice as under a continuation of private property.

That a limitation of the absolute liberty of the individual is under such circumstances unavoidable is true; but, as Stein knows (599), it is the same with every form of government. "There never has been, and never will be, an absolute liberty of the individual, for personal liberty without a correlative personal security is a chimera," and an atom of assured liberty is worth far more than any amount of liberty which is every moment threatened. Such phantom-liberty, however, is what not only man in a state of nature, but man under to-day's civilization, often possesses. Stein puts the following words into the mouth of the politically deluded proletarian: "It was formerly my duty, it is now my right, to starve" (612). The solidarity of the human race, however, on which a rational collectivism will be erected is no delusion, no phantom, "but an incontrovertible scientific fact, statistically proved" (665); aye, human solidarity is "the most profound thought of social evolution" (701). In these elementary conceptions I find myself agreeing with the author. Wherein I differ is based upon this fact: although Stein often condemns the evils arising from capitalistic individualism, although he often approaches the new view which says that in the preservation of one's kind race is of all importance, whereas the individual is but a point of transition, he yet is not free from the antiquated notion which ascribes to the individual, as compared with the group, an importance and independence which he never possessed. Stein theoretically assumes the interaction of individuals and groups of men (522) and their surroundings as against Gumpłowicz and Marx, who, respectively, in the theory of racial struggles, and in the all-directing power of economic influences, treat the influence of the individual as if he were entirely irrelevant. Stein thus believes that he represents a view intermediate between the old spec-

ulative doctrine which makes the individual everything, and the new exact method which makes him nothing. (Nietzsche, the pupil of the Sophists, is also to be reckoned a representative of the old doctrine, as Stein himself proved in his book entitled "Beyond Good and Evil.") It seems to the present writer as though Stein repeatedly inclines to a Carlylean hero worship, involving an exaggerated notion of the part played by individuals in the history of mankind. Thus, when he defends the despotic (*harten*) rulers (Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon) because "such grand human butchers have, with one bold stroke, done the work of centuries in furthering civilization" (115), he makes a statement which, if applied to Alexander, is very doubtful, and in the case of Cæsar and of Napoleon is evidently not apposite. Pompey might have defeated Cæsar at Pharsalus without altering the course of history, save in so far that the first Roman emperors would have borne other names. In so far as the civilization of the last century has been dependent upon political factors, it was not determined by Napoleon, but by the French Revolution. The declaration of the independence of the United States, perhaps the act of all acts in modern history which involved great consequences, was due, as fittingly becomes the beginning of democracy, to no one person, but was the impersonal act of a whole people.

Stein expresses the view of many other investigators, and, to a certain extent, of the present writer, when he states (358) that "governmental socialism" has the best chances for the future. One can also agree with him when, instancing Rodbertus, he asserts that Socialism is as compatible with national and monarchical as with international and democratic convictions (424). He strongly approves of a social monarchy; in fact, the idea of a general socialization under the domination of a ruler possessing great authority justly finds supporters among the educated classes of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, one factor is momentarily lacking,—viz., the monarch who is thoroughly educated in social politics, and who will give his whole force and power to the service of equalizing social justice. Even if he were found (and sooner or later by force of circumstances he will be, but too late, I fear), he would not be capable of all the heroic deeds with which Stein credits him: "Who knows but that a Napoleon of socialism or an Alexander of politics could with one sharp blow sever the Gordian knot of social politics more easily than that wild parliamentary conglomeration of glib-tongued lawyers, who to their mutual satisfac-

tion demonstrate that they are only blockheads" (428). (By the way, Stein sees only the picture of *bourgeois* parties, for there is not a single lawyer among the prominent Social-Democrats of Germany, France, or Austria.) The great dissatisfaction induced by the evils of parliamentarism may be justifiable, but it does not make it more probable that the social question could be solved with a single sharp blow, even by an absolute monarch. Such a fearfully exaggerated piece of rhetoric could only be excused in one of the parliamentary blockheads. A man of pure science ought to beware of it. This boundless utopianism appears much weaker in the sentence immediately following: "If the chief acquisitions of humanity are due to genius, there is no reason why time should not also give birth to a social genius, who could hasten social evolution and the realization of the ethical ideals of socialism more quickly than will probably happen in the regular way of immanent teleology." Here, too, the conclusion would be correct were not the premises false. All modern methods of thought rebel against the naïve conception which would account for the marked progress of mankind in any other way than by the added results of small causes. Even a new religion does not suddenly and unexpectedly descend from heaven, but gradually develops for one or more centuries, and then does not always develop according to the intention of its eminent founder, although it may have been named after him. Before Christ came John the Baptist, after him Paul, and little as we can imagine Christ without his predecessors, yet his apostles, and especially Paul, considerably modified his teaching, to say nothing of the interpretations which Greek wisdom introduced. St. Simonism is a striking example of a similar appearance in our century. It is well known in this case, on which the clear light of a critical time has fallen, that after his death the first apostles created the teaching which bears his name and will make it immortal. It is continually being proved that the individual does little, and that the community does most. Strangely enough, Stein believes he refutes this, when, by pointing (523) to the Czar, who could grant a constitution or cause all heterodox religionists to leave his empire within three months, he concludes that great political personalities can change the character of society by a violent blow or a decisive word. He somewhat naïvely considers such proofs of power the result of "a disturbed night." He has momentarily forgotten that the thoughts of an individual do not arise by pure chance, but are the last link in a long chain

made up of everything which has ever acted upon him. If a Czar were to grant a constitution to-day, this would not be his own free act, but more or less the result of events in and out of Russia. The same can be said of the religious example above given, whereby the character of society can be changed by a despot's word (523). The might of even a despot is minimized by his surroundings. Looked at *sub specie æternitatis* (a point of view adopted by Stein), the question whether a state receives a constitution ten years sooner or later is of no importance. A social monarchy, too, cannot of itself change the world; it can only hasten or hinder in a moderate degree the pace of development; however important its acts may be in detail, they are small *sub specie æterni*. What Stein, who constantly emphasizes his antagonism to Social-Democracy, wants is not "the abolition of the modern state," but "continuance of private management in socialized guise, a mixture of state and private management, which, while not quite abolishing wage labor, would gradually abolish all its loathsome evils" (648). This would be considered by other investigators, who do not agree with the Marxian Social-Democracy, and who criticise socialism more sharply and severely than Stein, as not the aim but the beginning of the end of the private capitalistic method of production. They, however, would agree with Stein that the socialization of law must take place within a social body before the social state becomes a ripe fruit. Hence, in spite of theoretical divergencies, there will be agreement on the immediate practical measures; this Stein admits. He points to Laurence Gronlund (602); he could have adduced many more who, while entertaining socialistic views, do not believe in the abolition of marriage or in all being paid alike. We can fully agree with his definition: "under socialization of the law we understand the protection of the economically weak, the conscious subordination of individual interests to a greater common whole, to the state, and, finally, to the whole human race" (607). Stein justifies the right to existence somewhat forcibly but brilliantly by saying that the modern state in "prohibiting abortions and the starvation of children" (*Kinderaussetzung*) has placed on the "individual resting in his mother's womb a legal compulsion to be born," even in the case of weaklings or cripples, which the Greeks deserted or killed. Therefore, the moral duty is incumbent upon the state of making "the right to live" a corollary of the "legal compulsion to be born" (616). This must take place through the "state guarantee of a minimum standard of life" (639).

The following social reforms are to provide the means: "nationalization of all mining industries, of water-power, of insurance, of inventions, and of all intellectual property, say, one generation after the death of the testator" (639). True, the author admits (640) that as a corollary to the minimum, which should be made to vary with the quality of the soil, the climate, the state of civilization, and the wealth of a country, there should be a maximum standard of life. This modest proposition is not very boldly made, and Stein is satisfied with a progressive income and inheritance tax.

The socialization of law is to be followed by a complimentary socialization of art, of morals, of science, and of education. In connection therewith, certain demands are made which the present writer can all the more endorse, as he himself has repeatedly urged them in various publications. Stein says (653), "whether human society is to be socialized from above downward, or from below upward, is more a question of time (*tempus*) than of principles." Although he is right here, he straightway falls into the worst form of utopianism when he dreams of the social emperor who with one blow, or with a single majestic word, can bring about the socialization of society more quickly and more thoroughly than it can be by the mole-like work of gradual democratization. If this be not mere rhetoric, he who would prefer socialization from above ought to point out all the more emphatically the childishness of the notion of bringing about a transformation through a theatre-king or by the wave of a magic wand. It would be necessary that several of the largest states should have at the same time successive generations of devoted monarchs, conscious of their goal, sacrificing themselves without individual vanity in order to further—by comparatively small degrees—the socialization, not of humanity, but of the continent of Europe alone. Stein has no faith in the endurance of a single imperial individual. Here again he judges by present casual events rather than *sub specie æterni*. I also believe with Stein that the individual in society is like a prism through whom the light of his *milieu* shines, and is seen in its component parts (533), and "each social act of an individual is the product of the interaction of the individual and his surroundings." This is also applicable to the question of the probability of there being a social ruler. The more a dynasty leans on a landed military nobility, the less likely is it to produce the social genius so ardently desired by Stein. The more a monarch is looked upon as the chief civil servant, and the more the civil servants—possessing nothing but their

pay—are regarded as the supporters of a policy of social reform, the easier it will be to govern society. A certain democratization of society as a counterpoise to the feudal state is the necessary presupposition to this. Any one who keeps out of the ruts must believe that the national differences, so strongly insisted upon by Stein, will exert their influence and cause a democratic development as the sole course historically possible for Western Europe and America, with the possibility that a social monarchy may arise in Central and Eastern Europe. This will apply all the more “if an ethical-social movement, broad and intense, carried on through all branches of polite literature, of science and art, awakens, sharpens, in other words, socializes, the conscience of the educated” (447).

We Socialists of the chair have a task next in importance to that of the press. For from our lecture rooms go forth (in Europe) the future officials impregnated with a social spirit, the precursors of a new social kingdom. It is for its propaganda among the educated that, in spite of several points of difference and many objections, we welcome this book of Stein's. Its bright *aperçus* will also serve as a recommendation to those who with much cause often fight shy of such ponderous tomes. Though occasionally the desire to shine by a play on words leads to an unfortunate metaphor, yet he has many pretty figures of speech, such as: “Utopianism is the mystic shadow cast before it by the coming social philosophy” (286); “Utopians are the poetical storm-birds which herald the tempestuous approach of a new era.”

Stein, in speaking of the “Nova Atlantis,” says with a certain pride, in reference to the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy, that Shakespeare criticises in “The Tempest” (Act ii, Sc. 7) the utopian fancies which Bacon approves (301). That this is not so, I already showed in 1892 in my book, “Die bürgerliche Kunst und die besitzlosen Volksklassen.” I also am convinced that Shakespeare was the author of the works attributed to him and not Bacon. But I am equally convinced that all who quote the above-mentioned scene against socialism—and in this respect Stein is merely the last of a long series—entirely overlook the fact that the ridicule comes from Sebastian and Antonio, the rogues and traitors, whereas good-hearted Gonzalo, the portrayer of the ideal state, behaves throughout the play in accordance with the naïve description of him in the cast, “an honest old counsellor.” It is, therefore, highly improbable that Shakespeare expressed his own views

through the treacherous politicians, Sebastian and Antonio, men who do not even hesitate at fratricide. One could with more justification draw the conclusion that the bard of Avon had expressed the melancholy truth that a peacefully anarchic state of nature, such as Gonzalo desires (his dreams have but little in common with socialism), is impracticable, because some men have the evil dispositions of an Antonio or a Sebastian. Stein introduces here (302) and often elsewhere (390, 407) a somewhat irrelevant glorification of Judaism, oppressed for centuries, and even to-day suffering; an exaggeration which affects one not quite pleasantly. He should rather have remembered the remarkable words which Shakespeare, otherwise so often anti-democratic, places in the mouth of Shylock in the celebrated trial scene :

“ You have among you many a purchas’d slave,
Which, like your asses, and your dogs, and mules,
You use in abject and in slavish parts,
Because you bought them :—shall I say to you,
Let them be free, marry them to your heirs ?
Why sweat they under burdens ? Let their beds
Be made as soft as yours, and let their palates
Be season’d with such viands. You will answer,
The slaves are ours :—So do I answer you :
The pound of flesh, which I demand of him,
Is dearly bought, is mine, and I will have it.”

Do not these words contain a biting satire on the strict definition of property ? As a matter of fact, the proud doge and the noble senators do not know what answer to make, and in their confusion wish to adjourn the sitting until Bellario’s arrival. So clear is the unanswerable accusation which comes from the despised usurer, that secretly they had to admit that his conduct was scarcely less heartless than theirs, that their pretended right of exploitation was not more excusable than his.

Stein does not deny the great evils of existing conditions. He even reproaches the physiocrats with “ not possessing sufficient intelligence to see that, from the wild play of industrial forces, the competition between husbandry and industry, there would spring up an industrial *bellum omnium contra omnes*, which would not subside, but be accentuated by the boundless individualization of moral and social egoism” (315). Unfortunately, the same complaint might be made concerning Stein and his defence of private property. It is an echo of Hegel’s oft unjustly ridiculed trichot-

omy, especially of his doctrine of reversion to the antithesis, when Stein says that "under the lasting sway of untrammelled capitalism, individualism would deny (*negiren*) itself to the utmost!" (331). For it is just the play of free competition which at last crushes the small concern and permits the few to absorb the many. Presumably he is thinking of trusts and corners among the surviving capitalists when he pens the damning sentence, "individualism is philosophically bankrupt when great capitalists form partnerships!" (331). In spite of this, he disapproves of genuine, outspoken socialism, and leans upon doubtful authorities whom scientific criticism has "destroyed," as Stein himself admits, although with some irony,—men such as Julius Wolf and Otto Ammon whom he upholds. It is depressing to hear Stein quite cheerfully remark that in the present order of society most men of talent, as Ammon recently tried to show, can rise (340), a proof of which, in the opinion of many experts, was not given by Ammon. Stein, as well as Ammon, forgets that we hear of nearly all the hundred who succeed, seldom, however, of the thousands who, possessed of similar abilities, are wrecked on the reef of capitalism and either sink entirely or see their powers disgracefully wasted. Stein, as is not unusual with him, changes his opinion later on when he remembers these sacrifices (748), and speaks of the talents lost to mankind as a reason for social reform. But he firmly believes (629), as "Ammon has so well shown," that the modern individualistic state "gives great intellectual efforts their due reward." He, however, grants to the socialistic state the advantage of "not only finding room for all the intellects we already have, but of allowing the greatest number of intellects to be developed." Similarly he vacillates when he accuses Louis Blanc, as a member of the new government, of not knowing how to utilize to the full the intoxicating success of February 1848; otherwise, "the world might have seen how a socialistic state must be created and whether it could exist in the middle of Europe" (355). He maintains that Blanc's yielding to his colleagues resulted in destroying himself and the socialistic state. "And thus the first Socialist through his vacillation missed the first opportunity offered by history of building up a socialist state of importance, and brought ruin to the cause he had called into life" (356). One is surprised to find such a lack of insight into these important events of history. Such passages can only be explained on the score of a rigorously individualistic, not to say small conception, which credits all deeds either to heroes or

pygmies. It is not, therefore, astonishing to find that the history of the *ateliers nationaux* (which, contrary to Louis Blanc's intentions, were purposely mismanaged by his fellow-rulers) is told with the customary inaccuracy. A few hundred pages later (623), Stein has changed his mind, and admits, what entirely invalidates his pathetic attack on Blanc, that "the Ministry of Works under Blanc sank to a stupid harlequinade because the social condition of France in the forties was far from having reached that stage when such a decisive social-political step could be taken with any chance of success."

But he is again lacking in insight when he says of Lassalle (413) that he only wished that "which was practicable and historically possible." Consequently, he was thoroughly practical when he asked the Prussian State in 1863 to advance one hundred million thalers in order to found working-men's associations. As a matter of fact, the social and economic condition of Prussia was then, as compared with that of France, so retrograde, that it made a scheme of that kind as impossible as it had been in France fifteen years before. This may be asserted without in any way belittling Lassalle's importance. For the great agitator knew well that the fulfilment of his ideas was at the time unthinkable, but he made use of this easily grasped catch-word in order to stir up a social movement among the masses. His correspondence with Rodbertus plainly shows that his social plans were much more extensive than appears from Stein's description (407-416). Taking this into account, in comparing the social reformer Lassalle with the international social revolutionary Marx, I cannot, like Stein, place myself entirely on the side of Lassalle, but I doubt whether he would follow the real Lassalle to the end, any more than he would Marx. For the final aim of Lassalle, as of Louis Blanc, was the complete nationalization of private property. This is identical with Marx's nationalization of the means of production.

In discussing Marx, Stein makes a striking biographical mistake in saying that Marx, Engels, and Lassalle did not have to take part in the struggle for existence as did St. Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc: "they were not obliged to earn their bread by their pens, but had the means and consequently the time and leisure to devote themselves without anxiety to their studies" (389). This is true absolutely only of Lassalle, to a certain extent of Engels, who had to spend much of his life in an office, and not at all of Marx. Strangely enough, among the authorities he mentions for

his biographical notes on Marx is Liebknecht's pamphlet. Now, it is this pamphlet which has made it known that for years, especially during the fifties, Marx had to earn his living and support his family by the arduous work of a London correspondent for American and other papers, and often endured bitter want. This is especially striking in Liebknecht's description of the early death of a child of Marx's. I admit that since I learned this I feel less like reproaching Marx for not having more fully enunciated "the materialistic conception of history" of which he is the father. The author of "Das Kapital," who also had to leave this standard work unfinished, had actually not the physical time necessary for the further exposition of his "materialistic" conception of history (more correctly termed "economic" by me and recently by D. Pasmanik in the Vienna weekly, *Die Zeit*, June 12 and 26, and July 3, 1897). Stein's account of Marx's leisure is thus calculated to give an inaccurate picture of the life of this great master of Social Democracy. It is difficult to understand how our author—who, by the way, treats Marx in his private capacity as kindly as he does Lassalle—could make such a grave error. I uphold what I have said against Marx elsewhere (especially in a lecture before the Vienna "Philosophic Society," May 15, 1896, printed in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, XX., 441-470), and coincide in the main with Stein's expositions. I also share with Stein the opinion that Marx obtained his conception of history, "his sociological point of view," intuitively not empirically (399). When comparing Marx with Copernicus, Kant, and Darwin, Stein rightly reproaches him with an insufficient expenditure of time and labor in developing his materialistic conception of history: empiric evidence was not sufficiently collected by him, and when he introduced it, it only "served to verify the stand-point which he had *a priori* adopted." But this is partly to be excused by the circumstances surrounding Marx's life, which Stein inaccurately describes. Important, and as I think apposite, is Stein's objection that Marx bound up his whole social philosophy with the fate of materialism as a philosophic system, and thus built on a quicksand; for "metaphysical materialism is one of those errors of mankind that has been thoroughly refuted" (400). For the rest, Stein finds, as I do, that the philosophic error lies less "in the materialistic conception of history itself, than in the exclusiveness" which is ascribed to it, not so much by Marx as by Engels and his paraphrasing followers. He does not deny the value of Marx's ser-

vices as an explorer in the region of Sociology (401). He emphasizes the fact that although "social being has always preceded social consciousness in point of time, the temporal priority is not dependent upon logical causality and ethical superiority" (401). Least of all may the economic conditions of production be regarded as "the sole (final) cause of all forms of social development." He lays stress on the fact (402) that, so far, the attempts to explain the phenomena of life through a single cause have suffered shipwreck. As others have already pointed out, the law of interaction must be taken into account. Although Stein's polemic against extreme Marxism is often penetrating, he is sadly astray on the subject of Marx's teaching when he abruptly remarks (438) "where would be the Social-Democratic party, to-day so imposing, had not ideological factors (Marx's '*Kapital*') co-operated with the economic ones!" This is an incredibly clumsy misunderstanding of the materialistic conception of history, which does not deny the influence of ideological factors, but merely maintains (to my mind erroneously) that these ideologies are solely the reflection of economic factors in the minds of men, hence strictly dependent upon the stage reached at any time by the methods of production. Consequently, as a final cause, the method of production of material life shapes the social, political, and spiritual life-processes.

Against the Marxian theory of value, Stein says, Why do all commodities contain only one mystic common property,—labor? Could not two or more elements of value be assumed?

"It is an inadmissible generalization to call the most important of the value-producing factors—labor—the sole one" (403). "The subjective, psychological factors of value (scarcity, usefulness, æsthetic and moral worth, piety, etc.) were overlooked by Marx to the detriment of his own theory of value" (404). Stein further recalls the appreciation-value of the Austrian school (Karl Menger, von Wieser, von Böhm-Bawerk) on whose shoulders he leans. Stein, who is himself inclined to overestimate intellectual work, raises the objection that "intellectual work in Marx's calculations is far from obtaining its due reward" (405). When he comes to sum up his opinion of Marxism, one can agree with him that "its chief sociological error is its one-sided mechanism and fatalistic determinism, borrowed from materialism" (405). Marx (and Engels) came off badly in social prognostication, for the predicted revolutions did not happen, and the dominion of capital asserts itself much more slowly than it should according to the "manifesto of the commu-

nists" and "Das Kapital." But Stein goes too far, when, relying on J. Wolf, he asserts (406 and 437) that the statistics of income tax prove that the middle class is not decreasing, but increasing. The question is not how many people there are with average incomes, but how many small businesses can exist alongside the big ones. Now the last German census of occupations shows that between 1882 and 1895 the number of independent small concerns has diminished very considerably, whereas that of the large ones has increased. Even if this development do not take place as quickly as Marx and his school assumed (as was recently admitted by Edward Bernstein in the *Neue Zeit*), it takes place in the direction indicated by him. The growth of the middle class is an optical illusion in so far as the statistics are based upon the number of private and public officials, officers, etc.; whereas, the actually economically independent middle class is everywhere on the decrease, and especially so in the towns. Like so much of the Marxian doctrine, the catch-word of the few owning all and the many owning nothing is a high-sounding phrase; even under the boundless sway of capitalism there would exist a middle class, but it would include fewer and fewer of the economically independent.

As a whole, the polemic against extreme Marxism forms one of the most interesting features of the work under discussion. After proving the relative justification of the materialistic conception of history (177-179), Stein very cleverly points out that, "under barbarism, economic conditions produce the class war, and thus further social development, whereas, under civilization, the human mind in its reflecting consciousness becomes a social power which, together with the economic conditions produces a marked influence on society and on the evolution of the State" (187).

Relevant, but perhaps too severe, is his opinion (774) that the one-sided insistence on the economic factor might result "in the exclusion of all socialism from socialism, that is, that those ethical considerations which originally led to socialism might be crowded out, and instead of *ethos*, which has so far been supreme, economics, solely and exclusively, would be introduced. Thus a one-sided historical materialism easily degenerates into a disconsolate historical pessimism!" Economic and ideological factors are in a state of constant interaction; therefore, one can undertake at the same time the solution of the economic and of the moral problem (775). Even followers of Marx must join in the criticism (407)

that, "every æsthetic charm and all ethic consecration have been entirely omitted" from his sociological determinism.

It is especially to those factors which Marx neglects that Stein, like so many others, turns in order to create a social revolution which would at once bring a renaissance of humanity and hasten the production of that higher type of man which has been the dream of all philosophers who believe in evolution. Stein gives expression to thoughts that are in men everywhere (559) when he energetically demands, as others have done before him, that instead of trying to prepare the soul for a world beyond our control, we should set about perfecting mankind on the earth which is subject to our social control (680), and where he considers the following to be the stages of this development: "through the medium of ideological factors, capitalism will give birth to the socialization of the law, and this will have to regulate the economic constitution and economic maxims of the future. Everything which contradicts the spirit of the socialized sense of law would be but codified wrong and be irrevocably abolished" (658). Here, certainly, is the parting of the ways, and to us earnest Socialists much will appear wrong which to the author—more individualist than Socialist—appears to be an inseparable condition of a progressing civilization. Development lies in "the form the world's events take, not in their contents" (37). The evolutionary principle common to us both does not prevent our striving to reach different goals; and my goal lies in the same direction, though several stations farther than Stein's. The journey, can, therefore, be begun together. I agree with him that the development of humanity is not plainly teleological, but only that it takes place in an immanently teleological way (49).

With Stein I believe (and have maintained this in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für Philosophie*, xx, 465, 466) that in "a socialistic civilized state the institution of monogamy must remain untouched, not only because it is an inevitable postulate of the opinions in law, morals, and religion of the more developed nations, but chiefly because the law of nature has shown that this is the highest development of human cohabitation" (77).

Stein says that "the development of marriage and of property proceed in general on the same lines,—transition from irregularity to incipient social imperatives, from community to society, from communism to individualism, from the chaotic mass to a finely-worked-out individualism" (91). Now this applies only in part to

property. In the communistic hordes there are already social imperatives, and the present free competition involves more lawlessness than seems to have existed under those primitive historical conditions. As the features of marriage and property have been only in part identical in the past, so they will be different in the future. From communism by way of individualism to collectivistic socialism seem to me the chief stages of development. In order to characterize my difference from Stein's, I call the philosophic ideal of the future collectivistic socialism. In the first stage, there exists indistinguishable equality of the members of the horde; gradually individual property develops which is favorable to selfishness; and, finally, after its dark side has been seen under capitalism, it will disappear, not as a retrogression to primitive communism, but as a progression to a form of state in which the means of production are the property of all, inequalities of work and disposition being considered.

Such a state will perhaps admit of the soil being cultivated in separate small plots which will possibly be made a "hereditary lease." In the socialized undertakings and management of manufacture and trade, the formula of social justice "to every one according to his value to the whole" (as I have elsewhere expressed it) can be so applied that by favoring the most deserving, the just claims of individuality may be made to accord with the more important claims of the community. The testimony in favor of original communism in marriage is not so strong as it is for original communism in property. The institution of monogamy thus far has been asserted only in favor of the man; and the establishment of equal conjugal rights in the relations of the sexes, would constitute the socialistic change: that form of marriage in which woman is considered to be the private property of man, beginning to develop into that kind of marriage in which man and woman not only live together, but with each other and with equal rights, and with a mutually severe observance of intellectual and sexual fidelity. The neglect of the woman question is one of the drawbacks of Stein's book. It is remarkable that the consideration of how stoic pantheism naturally led to a social conscience (222) did not awaken the thought that the monistic-pantheistic philosophy of life now current must assist socialism. In other instances Stein overestimates the value of analogies drawn from antiquity. He sees (216) in the small *bourgeois* suggestion of Aristotle that the state should increase the number of economically independent small proprie-

tors, a state-socialistic remedy such as was subsequently suggested by Louis Blanc and Lassalle,—an opinion which would have surprised the two great Socialist opponents of the small *bourgeoisie*. In the tendency towards a universal language, a universal religion, a universal code of morals and law (150), I see with Stein the evolution of modern man, but I think the last two have more chances in the future, and more scope in the present than the first two. Stein's religious ideas especially will meet with considerable opposition. Siegfried Mekler (in the *Mittheilungen der ethischen Gesellschaft* of Vienna, May, 1897) raised notable objections to his history of the origin of religion. Stein asserts that the "ascetic (*weltflüchtig*) pessimistic character" of Christianity arouses from the first a feeling "which is unfavorable to the consideration of philosophic problems, and to the presupposition of a confidence in human power" (244). But he hopes (679) that the clergy will see that "other-world" motives are daily losing their power, because an ardent desire to attend to "this world" has seized the whole body of educated men." As secularized clergy they must join this movement or be "irrevocably doomed to failure."

The new social form of religion must gradually surmount the life-denying elements of the historic religions and "positively produce the conscious and rational subordination of the individual to the eternal interests of the race" (689). In the future, insults to humanity must take the place of blasphemy (an insult to God), which to former generations represented the height of ecclesiastical transgression. They are guilty of this crime, who by their behavior disgrace the type of manhood and mutilate it for generations to come.

Propagation by such as suffer from contagious diseases or hereditary complaints is in a social religion the sin of sins. For in this case "the individual, with devilish wickedness, places his momentary individual desire above the racial interests of mankind" (689). In this connection it should be mentioned that Stein sees in the long dispute between Spencer and Weissmann only "a difference in the matter of time, but not in the principle of variability" (715). With this view the present writer fully agrees. Although I may somewhat undervalue the worth and importance of religious belief, yet I cannot believe with Stein in the recruiting power of atheism for social ideals; and I fear that the positive religions, in so far as they are still strong and united, will not fulfil Stein's hopes, and that, at any rate, in non-Protestant countries, the unhappy

conflict between science and belief will last, because the clerical organizations will be able to play off the ignorant against the educated. It would be preferable, in my opinion, to undertake the great social reform work in conjunction with the representatives of all religions. Should they refuse to work in the way pointed out by Stein, there remains nothing to do but to seek to prove that "the moral and social feelings are the evolutionary product of a more highly developed social organism," and with Ferdinand Tönnies to place one's hopes in a "secular clergy" of teachers, among whom zealous conviction and strength would certainly not be less than among the present ecclesiastical teachers.

We certainly do not agree with Stein that a secular clergy will approve of standing armies composed of all capable of bearing arms, and serving for at least a year, in order that "young men may acquire the military virtues of discipline, *esprit de corps*, and bravery which are just as valuable to the psychical man as suppleness of limb and the hardening against all temperatures produced by field-work are to the physical man" (740). According to Stein, in the United States of America, as in Russia, corruption celebrates "the wildest orgies," and he reproaches the United States with having "sacrificed the military type to the business type," whence arises the danger of the white race "being thrust back and oppressed by races greater in numbers and smaller in requirements" (740). Standing armies must continue as a "powerful bulwark against the external foe and as an impregnable fortress against the internal one." Stein does not seem to have heard of the drawbacks of militarism, of the cultivation of a blind obedience, of brutalities, and of the harm to morals pointed out even by clergymen. He cheerfully dismisses the question of expenditure in this wise: "Good deportment, abnegation, tough endurance, sturdy manliness, unconditional discipline, self-sacrifice, and the spirit of comradeship are national psychological qualities bred by the soldierly spirit not too dearly bought with billions" (741). This spirited panegyric is an involuntary reminder of the noted words, "the army is nothing but a picnic," spoken some years ago by a Prussian minister of war. Stein believes that even if war gradually disappears, as is probable, a nation in arms remains "an indispensable safeguard against despotism from above or anarchy from below." The majority of psychologists and historians would consider an army subject to unconditional service and serving at least a year, rather as a strengthening than a weakening of despotism.

The present writer is also inclined to believe that the good physical results of military service and the protection against anarchism from below may be obtained from a militia serving four to six months, inasmuch as physical degeneration can be much better combated through the rational training of the young by means of games, gymnastics, and sports of all kinds, than by military service.

Stein is very unfortunate in an argument he brings forward with much assurance: "American conditions cannot charm us so long as the power of the state is weakened whenever agitations of the 'rag-tag and bobtail' assume a serious aspect" (740). What he considers so impossible is nevertheless a fact, especially in Germany, where, in spite of the reduced time of military service (two years), the number of those who find North American conditions attractive and who much prefer the so-called power of the "rag-tag" to the "blessings" of militarism, is constantly increasing. And when Stein asserts that "without the social pedagogic power which lies latent in church institutions, in national education, and in the national system of law, we shall never attain a thorough socialization of human nature" (770, 771), we fear that his optimism may turn into pessimism. For the Church will be found to favor social reforms, but not those radical inner changes which he expects from it. Those from whom he might otherwise expect sympathy do not consider militarism as one of the national means of developing pedagogic power, especially as the United States, Great Britain, Norway, and Switzerland, countries which have all left this means unemployed, seem to have achieved much better results than the military states. Some of us evolutionists have certainly happier hopes, and expect to reach our goal more surely, if less quickly, through a continual state socialization of law (770), and at the same time a socialization of science, a secularizing of the clergy, and the blessed influence of a socialization of art, as was suggested at the first international Congress of Ethics at Eisenach in 1893. Too many compromises are bad and weaken one's convictions. Like Stein, we too hope for a social reformation. As he truly says, its success "inevitably depends upon its being carried out by a formal idea, a social ideal. This new ideal of civilization cannot possibly spring from fatalistic and atheistic materialism, but from evolutionism and the optimism springing therefrom" (775). But we believe that other means than those he suggests must be to some extent introduced in order to bring about a conscious, rational im-

provement of the type "man." In many respects, therefore, we are opponents.

In this discussion, many views expressed in Stein's thoughtful book, which has some defects, have had to go unconsidered, and points of difference have naturally been given more prominence than points of agreement. This does not preclude us from expressing the opinion that, in the bare attempt to bring out such a powerful book, Stein has earned the thanks of science. It has many really fine passages. Though one may not agree with him, his book will be read with great interest, and the reader will end it richer in new thoughts, and feel spurred on to action. "Social movements and philosophic social ideas further and advance each other" (247). This maxim is exemplified in Stein's work, which strongly emphasizes the idea of interaction. The present writer has not hesitated to take the position of an opponent when necessary, just because he assumes that the book will exert an influence.

Finally, in closing this discussion, let us express a harmony with the author, which has too often been interrupted, in our common belief that "the motto of the development of civilization is *per aspera ad astra*" (776).

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE FACTS OF THE MORAL LIFE. By Wilhelm Wundt, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig. Translated by Julia Gulliver, Professor of Philosophy in Rockford College, and Edward Bradford Titchener, Sage Professor of Psychology in the Cornell University.

ETHICAL SYSTEMS. By the same. Translated by Margaret Floy Washburn, Professor of Psychology and Ethics in Wells College.

These volumes contain translations of the first two parts of Wundt's "System der Ethik," as published in revised form in 1892; these two parts being the historical portion of the work, as distinguished from the constructive. It was doubtless wise to publish these two divisions of the historical section in two separate volumes; for, while their connection with each other and with the